They were robbed! Scoring by the middlemost to attenuate biased judging in boxing

Author:

Stuart Baumann, Carl Singleton

Keyword:

Economics, General Economics, General Economics (econ.GN)

journal:

date:

2024-02-09 00:00:00

Abstract

Boxing has a long-standing problem with biased judging, impacting both professional and Olympic bouts. ''Robberies'', where boxers are widely seen as being denied rightful victories, threaten to drive fans and athletes away from the sport. To tackle this problem, we propose a minimalist adjustment in how boxing is scored: the winner would be decided by the majority of round-by-round victories according to the judges, rather than relying on the judges' overall bout scores. This approach, rooted in social choice theory and utilising majority rule and middlemost aggregation functions, creates a coordination problem for partisan judges and attenuates their influence. Our model analysis and simulations demonstrate the potential to significantly decrease the likelihood of a partisan judge swaying the result of a bout.

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